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 ELECTION ANALYSIS 
 
Jobs and Youth Unemployment: 
It's bad but not as bad as you think 
 
 The Great Recession of 2008-2010 has inflicted a larger cumulative loss of UK output 
than any of the other post-war recessions. Nevertheless, unemployment is much lower 
than we would have expected given past experience. 
 
 Young people have fared badly during the recession, with larger increases in their 
unemployment rates than adults. But young people always do worse in downturns and 
there is no evidence that young people are doing relatively worse this time round than 
in previous recessions.  
 
 The youth labour market deteriorated after 2004, prior to the onset of the recession. 
The reasons for this are not well understood - the weakening of the adult labour 
market can only account for some of the rise in youth unemployment. Increased 
immigration, minimum wages, skill demand changes and schooling are possible 
explanations, but there is little compelling evidence for any of these factors.  
 
 Labour's welfare reforms – such as the New Deal for Young People introduced in 
1998 – have had a positive impact on jobs. But after 2004 the Employment Service 
de-emphasised the young unemployed compared to other groups (e.g. lone parents 
and those on incapacity benefits) and this may be a factor in the post-2004 rise in 
youth unemployment. 
 
 The trends for 18-24 year olds Not in Employment, Education or Training (NEET) 
follow the same pattern as youth unemployment. NEET rates for 16-17 year olds are 
very high (and rising) only if we include all part-time students. When these are 
removed teenage NEET rates are more like 10%.  
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Introduction 
 
Unemployment is a perennial policy concern, and youth unemployment is a particular worry 
because of the ‘scarring effects’ of joblessness, which can persist for a long time in an individual’s 
life
1
. 
 
When Labour came to power in 1997, one of the party’s five pre-election pledges was to ‘get 
250,000 under 25 year olds off benefit and into work’. Following on from the previous 
government’s efforts, policies such as the New Deal for Young People  emphasised the importance 
of job search. But the new policies went beyond Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) by guaranteeing 
some activity (either subsidised employment, a government job or education/training), for all young 
people who were on JSA for more than six months.  
 
Despite this policy activism, youth joblessness remains a problem - on some measures youth 
unemployed is higher today than in 1997.
2
 Youth joblessness has indeed risen dramatically since 
the recession began in 2008, but we argue that this is to be expected as ‘marginal’ groups almost 
always fare worse during recessions. 
 
The more surprising fact is that the youth labour market worsened between 2004 and 2007 before to 
the start of the current downturn. This is harder to explain – it is partly linked to the sluggishness of 
the whole labour market, but it may also be linked to changes in the priorities of the Employment 
Service.  
 
The trends for 18-24 year olds Not in Employment, Education or Training (NEET) follow the same 
pattern as youth unemployment. The NEET rates for 16-17 year olds are extremely high (1 in 5 and 
rising) only if we include all part-time students. When these are removed teenage NEET rates are 
more like 10%.  
 
 
The Great Recession of the late 2000s 
 
GDP and aggregate unemployment in the last three recessions 
 
Figure 1 plots GDP growth and the unemployment rate since 1975 – we use the ILO (International 
Labour Organisation) definition of unemployment from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) unless 
otherwise stated. The shaded areas denote the timing of the last three recessions the latest one, the 
last one (‘1990s’) and the earliest (‘1980s’).  
 
Unemployment rose sharply in all recessions, peaking at over 11% in 1983 and 10% in 1992. After 
the 1990s recession, unemployment fell steadily, levelling off at historically low rates of around 5% 
                                                 
1
 von Wachter et al (2009) and Gregg and Tominey (2001). 
2
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/nov/11/cameron-brown-pmqs-youth-unemployment 
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in the mid-1990s. When the latest recession hit in 2008 and 2009, unemployment climbed to 7.6% 
by the third quarter of 2009. 
 
Figure 2 plots the cumulative loss of GDP since the start of each of the last three recessions. The 
1980s recession was worse than the 1990s recession. But despite getting off to a slightly slower 
start, the latest downturn has seen a larger cumulative fall of output than even the Thatcher 
recession – a 6% or more fall in GDP. 
 
Figure 1: UK unemployment and annual GDP growth rate, 1975-2009 
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Source: Annual LFS 1975-1991 and calendar quarters 1992q2 to 2009q3. ONS GDP from 1975q1 to 2009q4 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/. Annual GDP growth. Unemployment rate (ILO) is measured yearly in 
March/April/May and linearly interpolated. 
 
Unemployment by age group 
 
Figure 3 plots the unemployment rates for the population of working age (16-64) and for three 
subgroups – prime age (25-49), young (18-24) and teenagers (16-17). The prime age group follows 
the general pattern of the aggregate labour market, but it is clear that the young are much more 
sensitive to the state of the business cycle. The unemployment rate is higher for the younger groups, 
and the magnitude of this disadvantage widens during a recession. 
 
This outcome is unsurprising as employers will be reluctant to lose more experienced workers who 
have firm-specific skills (and also greater redundancy costs), so the burden of adjustment typically 
falls on low wage workers, such as young people. (Minorities and the less educated also tend to fare 
worse during downturns.) 
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Figure 2: Cumulative growth of GDP in the last three recessions 
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Source: ONS GDP from 1975q1 to 2009q4. We normalise to 1 the quarter before the start of each recession (dates as 
first GDP decrease) 1979q4, 1990q2 and 2008q1.  
 
Figure 3: Unemployment rates by age group, 1975-2009 
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Source: Annual LFS 1975-1991 and calendar quarters 1992q2 to 2009q3. Unemployment rate (ILO) is measured yearly 
in March/April/May and linearly interpolated.
 4 
The teenagers do not appear to have experienced the same falls in unemployment after the 1990s 
recession as older groups. But this trend conceals important selection effects, as increasing numbers 
of non-employed teenagers are staying in education, and we discuss them in more detail below. 
 
Figure 4 plots the employment rate for each of the three recessions. The employment rate was at 
historically high rates in 2007 prior to the Brown recession, yet despite the much larger fall in 
output shown in Figure 2, the employment rate has fallen by less than in the previous two 
recessions. This is the sense in which the labour market appears to be performing better than in the 
past. 
 
Figure 4: Employment rates in the last three recessions 
54.0
55.0
56.0
57.0
58.0
59.0
60.0
61.0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Quarters
1980/81 recession 1990/91 recession
2008/09 recession
 
Source: LFS employment rate from 1971q1 to 2009q3. UK, all individuals aged 16 and over, seasonally adjusted 
(MGSR). http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/ Reference quarters 1979q4, 1990q2 and 2008q1 (first quarter before 
GDP decrease). 
 
There are a number of possible explanations for this, including: 
 
 A genuine improvement in the way job ‘matches’ are made through a more effective 
Employment Service. This is the ‘optimistic’ story that the cumulative reforms made since 
1997 – such the New Deal and Job Centre Plus – have helped to improve matching in the 
labour market. For example, the ability (and incentive) to switch from JSA to incapacity 
benefit has been much reduced, which is a positive move as exit rates from disability 
benefits are much lower than from JSA (in part due to less emphasis on helping people look 
for jobs). 
 
 Greater wage moderation (‘wage flexibility’) reducing the need for employers to shed jobs. 
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 The industrial composition of the shock has been in sectors that have high capital-labour 
ratios (for example, finance and manufacturing), so the GDP fall has been disproportionately 
greater than the jobs fall. 
 
 Higher unemployment is still to come (for example, when public sector employment starts 
to fall with planned spending cuts). 
 
But has the recent recession hit young people much worse than in the past? Figure 3 shows that the 
unemployment rate for the young has increased by more  than the unemployment rate for older 
groups since the onset of the 2000s recession.   
 
Furthermore, hourly wages appear to be falling for the younger groups more than the older groups; 
and even for those who are employed, average hours worked fell by more for the younger groups 
than the older groups. This all seems to indicate that young people have been bearing the brunt of 
the adjustment. 
 
Figure 5: Proportionate growth in claimant count by age in last three recessions 
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Source: ONS claimant count current data up to 2009q4 (1985-2009), historical data (1983-1985) and registrants (1979-
1982) by age band (February 2010). Reference quarters 1979q4, 1990q2 and 2008q1 (1st quarter before GDP decrease). 
Historical data are for a given calendar month, a monthly time series has been created by linear interpolation, leading to 
the quarterly data, which were seasonally adjusted.  
 
But it could be said that this has been the general pattern in all recessions (‘twas always thus’). The 
unemployment rate for young people is about the same as its 1990s highpoint and better than the 
1980s peak, despite the fall in GDP being deeper. (The higher absolute number of young 
unemployed is due to the larger labour force and so is not really a relevant comparison.) 
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Figure 5 examines this more formally, breaking down the claimant count by age group in each 
recession
3
. The growth of youth unemployment (relative to the old) in this recession looks no worse 
than previous recessions – if anything slightly better. 
 
We conclude that the available information does not suggest that there is a special problem of youth 
unemployment in this recession compared with past experience. The fact that young people suffer 
more during downturns is quite consistent with what has happened in previous recessions in the UK 
and elsewhere. A bigger problem is what was happening before the recession. We now turn to this 
issue. 
 
 
Why did youth unemployment rise before the Great Recession? 
 
Prime-age unemployment in the UK has been falling dramatically since the early 1990s – from 
nearly 9% in 1993 to 3% in 2005, after which it broadly stabilised and then rose again in 2008. But 
for the 18-24 age group, unemployment started rising in 2004, several years in advance of the 
recession. Thus there seems to be a component of the adult-youth unemployment differential that 
does not seem to be purely explained by the stronger impact of cyclical downturns on young people.  
 
Despite several forces that may be in theory related to the poor performance of the youth labour 
market in recent years, the bulk of the rise in youth unemployment between 2004 and 2008 remains 
largely unexplained. We examine several factors: immigration, unemployment benefit reform, the 
minimum wage and skill demand. 
 
Rising immigration 
 
As the rise in youth unemployment dates back to 2004, the year of European Union enlargement to 
take in eight countries of Central and Eastern Europe (plus Cyprus and Malta), it would be natural 
to think that the increase in youth unemployment is related to stronger competition from immigrant 
labour.  
 
The UK has experienced a record increase in immigration in the past few years. The proportion of 
foreign-born population was below 6% in the early 1990s, but is currently about 10%. In London, 
this proportion rose from 28% to the current level of around 40%. If immigration has an effect on 
the labour market prospects of natives, it may hurt youths more strongly than adults. Immigrants 
who are less skilled than natives will be closer substitutes for inexperienced youths.  
 
Although youth unemployment is positively correlated with the share of immigrants in the regional 
labour market, this result is driven solely by the contrast between London and the rest of the UK (as 
London experienced particularly high rates of immigration and a relatively higher increase in 
unemployment). This raises the suspicion that other factors may explain this correlation. Overall, 
there is no compelling evidence of a causal impact of higher migration on youth unemployment 
(Card, 2009). 
 
Unemployment benefits 
 
The poor showing of the youth labour market is particularly worrying given the considerable policy 
reform to the Employment Service (especially for young people) in the last two decades.  
                                                 
3
 The LFS was only annual prior to 1992, so we cannot do ILO quarterly unemployment rates for earlier recessions. 
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Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) was introduced in 1996 as the main form of unemployment benefit 
and greatly increased the job search requirements for receiving benefits. It did appear to reduce the 
claimant count, but few of those leaving seemed to find sustainable jobs. JSA did not seem to 
improve the overall employment rate significantly (Manning, 2009) and may even have reduced it 
for the young (Petrongolo, 2009). 
 
While the claimant count and LFS unemployment have been very close until October 1996 for the 
population over 18 years old, LFS unemployment remained well above the claimant count in the 
post-JSA period.
4
 Thus there is evidence of increasing numbers of workers who left the 
unemployment register but did not find jobs. About half of the 18-24 LFS unemployed do not claim 
JSA (compared with a third for 25-49 year olds). When dropping out of the welfare system, 
individuals may become more detached from the labour market and spend less effort on job search 
than while on unemployment benefits.  
 
The New Deal for Young People was introduced in 1998 with the aim of improving the incentives 
and prospects for young workers to find jobs. All 18-24 year olds on JSA for six months now 
receive help with job search from a dedicated personal adviser. So there is some ‘carrot’ of job 
search assistance as well as a tougher ‘stick’ of stricter monitoring. 
 
Rigorous evaluations show that job finding rates increased by about 20% as a result of the policy 
(Blundell et al, 2004, di Giorgi, 2005). These evaluations exploit the fact that there was a large 
difference in treatment between 24 years olds who were in the programme (the ‘experimental 
group’) and 25 year olds who were not (the ‘control group’). Blundell et al (2004) also use the fact 
that the New Deal was piloted early in areas first and showed very similar programme effects.  
 
Around 2004, the Employment Service was incentivised to focus less on young people on JSA and 
relatively more on other groups such as lone parents and those on incapacity benefits (through a 
system of ‘job points’). This was because the problem of long-term youth unemployment was 
thought to have been broadly solved. Although there is no rigorous evaluation of this change, the 
timing does make one suspect that this may have been a cause. 
 
A further problem is that the increasing numbers of LFS unemployed who are not claiming JSA 
(shown in Figure 8) separate them from any direct effect of the New Deal and the Employment 
Service in general.  
 
Minimum wage 
 
The National Minimum Wage was introduced in the UK in April 1999, but 16-17 year olds were 
exempt. In October 2004, the minimum wage was extended to cover workers aged 16-17 who are 
not apprentices, and this coincides with a strong increase in their unemployment rate. 
 
Research in the UK has generally found few jobs effects of the wage floor.
5
 For example, Dickens 
and Draca (2005) find that the 2003 increase in the minimum wage had insignificant employment 
                                                 
4
 One possible reading of these series is that the JSA removed from the register those who were not really looking for 
work or claiming fraudulently. Another interpretation is that the non-claimant unemployed simply have a level of search 
effort above the ILO/LFS threshold, but below the JSA threshold.  
5
 Machin et al (2003) detect a mild reduction in employment in the care homes sector after the introduction of the 
minimum wage. As the care homes sector is particularly vulnerable to the introduction of the minimum wage given the 
low starting level of wages, their estimates may be interpreted as an upper bound for the aggregate employment effects 
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effects for all demographic groups including youths. Furthermore, if minimum wages were to 
blame, we would expect a positive jobs impact on teenage apprentices, who were exempt from the 
2004 legislation. In fact the proportion of apprentices in the 16-17 year old population fell from 
4.1% in the first quarter of 2003 to 3.1% in the first quarter of 2007,
6
 casting doubt on the minimum 
wage explanation. 
 
Falling demand for low skilled workers 
 
There has been a large increase in wage inequality over the last three decades in the UK. The wage 
premium for being educated has risen despite a huge increase in the supply of college-educated 
workers, which implies that there has been an increase in the demand for skills. This is probably 
due to new ‘skill-biased’ technologies, but trade with less developed countries like China and India 
and falls in union power may also play some role. There are similar rises in the demand for skills in 
the United States and other countries (see, for example, Machin and Van Reenen, 2008). 
 
A rise in demand for human capital may disproportionately hurt the young because they have less 
experience. This secular explanation is not so persuasive as youth unemployment was falling from 
1992 to 2004 (and for parts of the 1980s) in the face of this rising demand for skill, so skill biases in 
labour demand are unlikely to be the explanation. 
 
One possibility is that the quality of education for the type of young people likely to be unemployed 
may have declined. Although standards as a whole appear to be rising, it is possible that targets 
have led schools to neglect some of the ‘hard to reach’ that may up as non-employed. 
 
Idle youth? What about the young NEETS?  
 
Unemployment rates may give a misleading impression of the labour market because of the large 
increase in the fraction of young people staying in full-time education. An alternative indicator is 
the proportion of the age group who are NEETs – ‘not in employment, education and training’. 
Reducing the number of young NEETS has been a priority of the Department for Children, Schools 
and Families. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of the minimum wage. Stewart (2004a, 2004b) finds neither the introduction of the minimum wage nor the 2000 and 
2001 upratings had significant employment effects for adults (aged 22+) or youths (18-21). 
6
 The data source is the LFS individual record files. 
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Figure 6: NEET rates 1992-2009 (aged 16-17), seasonally adjusted 
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Source: LFS calendar quarters 1992q2 to 2009q3. NEET1 defines as NEET (not in employment, education or training) 
all those who are not working, are not enrolled in either education or training, and declare that they are not working or 
studying towards a qualification. This latter information is only available since 2000. NEET2 defines as NEET those 
who are not working or enrolled in either education or training. NEET3 defines as NEET those whose main economic 
activity is not education, training or work. 
 
 
Although the levels of NEET differ for 18-24 year olds they all show the same trends as the youth 
unemployment rates discussed above – a steady fall from the 1990s recession and then a rise 
starting in 2004 and accelerating in 2008. 
 
Even prior to the most recent recession, several media reports have expressed worries that large 
proportions of 16-17 year olds were ‘doing nothing’ (that is, they were NEETS). But measuring the 
number of NEETS precisely is not straightforward because of the ambiguity of whether someone is 
‘really’ in education or training (for example, they might say they are at school but never turn up).  
 
The ‘narrow’ definition (defined like the official rate) excludes those who are in any type of 
education or training from NEET. According to this definition, at the end of 2009, about 9% of all 
16 and 17 years olds were NEET (see Figure 6, series ‘NEET1’). But if we include in the NEET 
count all those who say they are in education or training but would accept a job offer, this number 
leaps to 19% (series ‘NEET3’). 
 
The difference is mainly in the fact that there are a lot of students looking for part-time jobs – and 
thus it is incorrect to classify them all as NEET or ‘doing nothing’. But at the same time, it may be 
plausible that some of those who declare themselves to be receiving some kind of education and 
looking for jobs have essentially dropped out of the education system – thus the ‘narrow’ 9% figure 
underestimates the NEET rate. 
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Figures 6 shows the evolution in alternative NEET measures over time. The ‘narrow’ definition 
(‘NEET1’) is only available since 2000, as it is based on a question about whether an individual is 
‘working or studying towards a qualification’. To obtain a longer time series, one can use 
information available since 1992 on school attendance and enrolment in training programmes 
(‘NEET2’). For the time span when both measures are available, NEET2 is not more than a 
percentage point above NEET1 and the trends move in an identical way. 
 
The true trends of teenage NEETs are hard to gauge, partially because there is a lot of seasonal 
variation. On the broad definition, the numbers have stayed high since the 1990s recession. The 
narrow series is only available for a shorter period of time, but here there does seem to be some 
improvement in the post-2005 period with little effect in the recession. 
 
This suggests that many more teenagers are choosing to stay at school rather than face a hostile 
labour market. The planned extension of compulsory schooling will cement these trends. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The UK labour market has held up surprisingly well so far given the depth of the current recession. 
Young people, however, have fared much worse than other groups with larger increases in their 
unemployment and bigger falls in hours and wages. 
 
We argue that, unfortunately, this is to be expected as young people always suffer worst during 
downturns, and it does not seem that (relatively) they are doing particularly badly in the latest 
recession compared with the Thatcher and Major recessions. 
 
More worrying, however, is that the fact that youth unemployment and NEET rates were bad going 
into the recession having been rising since 2004. The existing evidence does not allow us to give a 
firm answer as to why after over a decade of steady improvement, youth unemployment started 
rising in the mid-2000s. 
 
We think that part of it was due to some softening of the overall labour market, and part of it was 
due to changes in the Employment Service, which targeted other ‘at risk’ groups with greater 
vigour. The other suspects – immigrants, the minimum wage and skill demand – do not seem to 
blame. 
 
Finally, the refrain of ‘idle youth’ is overstated as the young NEET numbers typically include a 
large number of students who are seeking part-time jobs. 
 
 
April 2010 
 
 
 
For further information 
 
Contact Barbara Petrongolo (b.petrongolo@lse.ac.uk), John Van Reenen (j.vanreenen@lse.ac.uk), 
or Romesh Vaitilingam on 07768-661095 (romesh@vaitilingam.com) 
 
 
 11 
References 
 
Blundell, R, M Costa Dias, C Meghir and J Van Reenen (2004) ‘Evaluating the Employment 
Impact of a Mandatory Job Search Assistance Programme’, Journal of the European Economics 
Association 2(4) 569-606  
 
Card, D (2009) ‘Immigration and Inequality’, NBER Working Paper No. 14683 
 
Dickens, R and M Draca (2005) ‘The Employment Effects of the October 2003 Increase in the 
National Minimum Wage’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 693 
 
Di Giorgi, G. (2005) “The New Deal for Young People Five years on”, Fiscal Studies, 26(3) 371-
383 
 
Machin, S, A Manning and L Rahman (2003) ‘Where the Minimum Wage Bites Hard: Introduction 
of Minimum Wages to a Low Wage Sector’, Journal of the European Economic Association 1: 1-
154 
 
Machin, S and J Van Reenen (2008) ‘Changes in Wage Inequality’, in The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics  
 
Manning, A (2009) ‘You Can’t Always Get What You Want: The Impact of the UK Jobseekers’ 
Allowance’, Labour Economics 16: 230-50 
 
Petrongolo, B (2009) ‘What are the Long-term Effects of UI? Evidence from the UK JSA Reform’, 
Journal of Public Economics 93: 1234-53  
 
Stewart, M (2004a) ‘The Impact of the Introduction of the UK Minimum Wage on the Employment 
Probabilities of Low-Wage Workers’, Journal of the European Economic Association 2: 67-97 
 
Stewart, M (2004b) ‘The Employment Effects of the National Minimum Wage’ Economic Journal 
114: C110-16 
 
Von Wachter, T, J Song and J Manchester (2009) ‘Long-term Earnings Losses Due to Mass Lay-
offs during the 1982 Recession: An Analysis using US Administrative Data’, mimeo, University of 
Columbia 
 
 
